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In 2019, the Trump administration finalized the American 
withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF Treaty). For three decades, INF was fundamental to the 
non-proliferation regime, European strategic stability and Russian-
American relations. This investigation correlates with prominent 
American political studies: i) Trump’s populist conservatism; ii) a 
conflictive global system with the rise of China and the resumption 
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sources. This study is expected to contribute to discussions about 
Trumpism and American foreign policy.
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Resumo
Em 2019, a administração Trump finalizou a retirada norte-americana do Tratado de 
Forças Nucleares de Alcance Intermediário (Tratado INF). Durante três décadas, o INF foi 
fundamental para o regime de não-proliferação, estabilidade estratégica europeia e relações 
russo-americanas. Esta investigação dialoga com estudos políticos proeminentes sobre EUA: 
i) conservadorismo populista de Trump; ii) sistema global conflituoso com a ascensão da 
China e a retomada da Rússia. Este artigo emprega multimétodos qualitativos: narrativa 
causal e o método histórico. Dois conjuntos de fontes são empregados: (i) documentos 
desclassificados do governo norte-americano; (ii) fontes narrativas. Espera-se que este 
estudo contribua para as discussões sobre o trumpismo e a política externa norte-americana.
Palavras-chaves: Tratado INF; Donald Trump; Estados Unidos; Política Externa.
Resumén
En 2019, la administración Trump finalizó la retirada estadounidense del Tratado de Fuerzas 
Nucleares de Alcance Intermedio (Tratado INF). Durante tres décadas, INF fue fundamental 
para el régimen de no proliferación, la estabilidad estratégica europea y las relaciones 
ruso-estadounidenses. Esta investigación se correlaciona con destacados estudios políticos 
estadounidenses: i) el conservadurismo populista de Trump; ii) un sistema global conflictivo 
con el ascenso de China y la reanudación de Rusia. Este artículo emplea un multimétodo 
cualitativo: narrativa causal con el método histórico. Se emplean dos conjuntos de fuentes: 
(i) documentos desclasificados del gobierno de los Estados Unidos; (ii) fuentes narrativas. 
Se espera que este estudio contribuya a las discusiones sobre el trumpismo y la política 
exterior estadounidense.
Palavras-clave: Tratado INF; Donald Trump; Estados Unidos; Política Externa.
Introduction
This paper aims to understand the domestic and international factors of the 
United State’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(henceforth INF Treaty) under the Trump administration in 2019. The disengagement 
was unwelcomed by lawmakers (both Democrats and Republicans), international 
allies, and most scholars since no benefit could be explicitly displayed. Still, 
Trumpist advocates rejoiced in the president’s isolationist, unilateralist and hawkish 
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approach and his commitment to reassert American might against international 
foes. This inquiry correlates with two prominent fields in contemporary American 
political studies: i) the persistent influence of Trump’s conservatism over American 
politics and its effects on foreign policy and international role; ii) the emergence 
of a conflictive multipolarity with China’s ascension and Russia’s resumption, 
which has been called “New or Second Cold War.”
In 1987, Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) 
reached a historic moment when they signed the INF Treaty. Under the INF, the 
superpowers agreed, in an unprecedented way, on the elimination of all their 
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and Ground-launched cruise missile 
(GLCM) stockpile and related launchers. IRBM and GLCM are both ground-based, 
ranging from 500km to 5500 km and multi-setting because they can transport 
conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear warheads (Hughes 2009). Until 
1991, the U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR) eliminated 2,692 missiles and initiated 
a 10-year on-the-spot verification (up to 2001). In 2014, the U.S. accused Russia 
of an alleged violation and material breach when bilateral tensions escalated. 
Moreover, American concerns about the Chinese current missile build-up have 
become central in its strategic unease since the late 2000s. Trump’s response 
was to withdraw the U.S. from the INF Treaty unilaterally on August 2, 2019. 
The complete withdrawal was expected but still was met with broad concern. 
The INF’s primary motivation had been a critical framework for European 
security since the 1980s, Russian-American relations, and the international non-
proliferation regime.
The 32-years-old Treaty generated extensive research. Overall, the conclusions 
about its existence and continuity have been positive. In the 1990s, researchers 
established its success in the non-proliferation regime, but since the early 2000s, 
a vertical proliferation has been befalling in China, North Korea, Iran, India, 
and Pakistan. The international system presently faces a very high possibility 
of new testing, development, and deployment of formerly banned missiles by 
Russia and the U.S. European and Asian theatres are severely more affected 
by the INF’s end; still, it engenders menacing security effects over the whole 
international system.2
2 The New York Times chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, Steven Erlanger, made a summary about 
current American challenges in the nuclear arena. Presently, the U.S. faces a growing threat from nuclear 
adversaries, less arms control overall, and generalized doubt about its resolve to act, after Trump’s isolationist 
approache (Erlanger 2021).
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Russian-American and Chinese-American rivalries have been ascending 
continuously since the early 2010s. The first is strategic competition, in which the 
two most important military powers keep their struggle over areas of influence 
(Pautasso 2014). The second is economic competition and future strategic one, 
given China’s rapid military build-up and current preponderance in international 
trade, tech industries, and infrastructure. Although the concept of a “New or 
Second Cold War” is not widely embraced nor unanimous, a new competitive 
multipolar framework might be dominant from now on. So, the INF demise is 
a central piece because its security effects will overflow to other dimensions of 
geopolitics and international affairs.
Moreover, the American current political scenario has dominated media 
outlets worldwide with the recent 2020 presidential election. The Trumpist-4-
years White House has placed the U.S. in an isolationist pathway not seen since 
before World War II and has been identified as a brand new variety of American 
conservatism (Ayerbe 2018; Pecequilo and Lopes 2018). The Republican party had 
been overwhelmingly Reaganist since the 1980s, but now, its future is uncertain. 
Still, even with Trump’s defeat, political scientists are foreseeing a lasting and 
prevailing influence of this new American politics approach, this is, Trumpism.
The INF Treaty demise is a specific part of this context, however a critical 
one. During the Cold War, the two most dangerous scenarios were derived from 
missile development, testing, and deployment: the Cuban missile (1962) and 
Euromissiles (1983) crises. Although the INF had prohibited only two missile 
classes, those represent more geostrategic complexities than other varieties. 
First, in continental countries such as Russia and China, they can be deployed 
extensively and possibly threaten all of Europe and Asia. Second, to deploy 
countervailing and countermeasure deterrence missiles, the U.S. would need 
special permissions from other governments. Since the demise, Japan, South 
Korea, Poland, and Germany explicitly warned they would not accept American 
IRBM and GLCM in their territories.
This research paper is based upon a multimethod design, combining the 
causal narrative with the historical approach to grasp the U.S. withdrawal 
pathway. The first correlates strongly with comprehensive storyline epistemology 
because intertwined variables (international and domestic) acted parallelly and 
sequentially, steering the U.S. to the path of withdrawal. The second enhances 
internal validity by employing source-triangulation as a crucial methodological 
tool to support the findings. This source-driven has engaged official unclassified 
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U.S. government documents, such as reports on adherence to and compliance 
with arms control, the Congress’ National Security Defensive Acts (NSDA), and 
Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy. Narrative sources are 
also utilized, such as Trump’s press releases and Twitter posts, John Bolton’s 
memoir, and official communiqués. The spatiality encompasses the Department 
of Defense, Department of State, the U.S. Mission to International Organizations 
in Geneva, the U.S. Congress and the White House.
This paper has been divided into four parts. Section one begins by laying out 
the INF Treaty’s historical background and looks at how it took a crucial role in 
the non-proliferation regime, European security stability, and Russian-American 
relations. Section two describes the missile proliferation during the Obama 
administration, the ascending rivalry with Russia and the alleged violation. In 
section three, I review the present pieces of evidence from the Trump administration 
to examine the INF’s recent history and demise. Finally, the final remarks section 
assesses the outcomes and short and medium-term missile proliferation and 
impacts on contemporary international security.
The INF creation and importance for international security
In the 1960s, the USSR deployed its first intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM), placing the U.S. continental territory under an international foe’s reach 
for the first time. The development, production, and deployment of ballistic 
missiles became central concerns during the Cold War. In the 1970s, the Soviets 
developed a powerful intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the SS-20, 
threatening Western Europe. At the time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) responded with a dual-track strategy: NATO would continue negotiating 
a diplomatic response towards the Soviet military build-up, whilst the U.S. 
would develop and deploy its improved IRBM version, the Pershing II (Collins 
2009). Known as the Euromissile crisis, the 1983 IRBM American-Soviet dispute 
is considered the second most dangerous moment in the Cold War (after the 
1962 Cuban missiles crisis). The works of McGeehan (1982), Haass (1988), 
and Hughes (2009) focused on the initial developments, NATO’s response and 
the massive popular outrage, which stirred up the Nuclear Freeze campaign 
in the U.S. and Western Europe. Complementarily, Glitman and Burns (2006) 
and Rueckert (1993) focused on within-case studies and historical approaches 
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to explore the negotiation itself. Overall, all scholars recognized the improving 
Soviet-American relations since 1985, when Reagan found Gorbachev a willing 
Soviet leader to negotiate.
After the USSR fall, the Treaty was inherited by six former republics: Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, Russia 
became the de facto successor, remaining the major military power after the 
Soviet secession. The Treaty kept a withdrawal rule, which stipulated that either 
party to request termination should respect a six-month deadline and present 
consistent motivation.
However, the INF restricted scope has always been criticized, and alternatives 
were put to lessen its fragility. The U.S. and its allies have created the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to prevent the technology transfering needed 
to create offensive missiles. The MTCR was strengthened in the 1990s when 
Russia and other former members of the Warsaw Pact joined, promoting what 
Kearn (2012) called a “big cut in supply” (Kearn 2012, 24:26). In 2003, another 
significant development took place when the George W. Bush administration 
(2001-2009) launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) against trafficking 
in weapons of mass destruction and equipment necessary for its use, such as 
ballistic missiles (U.S.Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation 
2019). Kearn (2012) concluded the INF Treaty, the MTCR, and the PSI have been, 
jointly, successful in limiting horizontal proliferation, i.e., in countries that did 
not have prior technologies for ballistic missile development. However, during 
the 2000s, the international system observed a vertical proliferation, in which 
the former missile possessors continued to develop and improve their technical 
capabilities. China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan refused to participate in the 
control regimes and managed to develop capable IRBM, among other offensive 
missiles (Kearn 2012). For a long time, India has also refused to be part of the 
MTCR, but that changed in 2016 after the country became an official member 
(MTCR 2021).
INF’s role in international regimes is vastly explored. It seems indisputable 
the INF Treaty wielded a crucial role in the non-proliferation regime. The first 
assessments came in the 1990s in Ozga (1994) and Bowen (1997), whose main 
concern was the MTCR first-decade effectiveness. The authors concluded the 
missile non-proliferation regime improved qualitative and quantitatively, with 
prominent missile exporters accepting self-imposed restrictions. In the 2000s, 
Feickert (2003) and Gormley (2008) continued such evaluation. Although their 
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writings were not restricted to the INF Treaty, the scholars reassessed arms control 
and non-proliferation regimes and manifested the Treaty’s continuous importance 
and effectiveness. However, it was noticed limited usefulness regarding the GLCM 
proliferation for two mains reasons. First, GLCM components are similar to 
civil aviation, so the trading restrictions were not viable restraint tools. Second, 
GLCM-related rocketry (as the American Tomahawk missile) was broadly used 
by the U.S. Army during the Gulf War (1990-1991) and Iraq (2003-2011) and 
Afghanistan (2001-) wars (Kearn 2012).
In parallel to the non-proliferation regime, and despite it, the beginning of 
the 21st century testified the gradual return of Russian-American rivalry. In 2002, 
Bush pulled the U.S. out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), another 
significant Cold War outcome signed by Richard Nixon in 1972. The ABM Treaty 
prevented a likely and costly arms race to create anti-ballistic missile defense 
systems (Schulzinger 2012).3 Such defense systems have been a constant in 
international security since the early Cold War years because, as Matchett (2021) 
affirms, they create an overall feeling of safety, and its defensive nature is much 
more political admissible. However, missile defense systems have a fatal flaw: 
they are cost-prohibitive and are moderate easily overrun by offensive systems. 
Despite this weakness, defensive systems exert a strong appeal in American 
presidents and lawmakers (especially Republicans), having Reagan’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative a meaningful case.4
Following this pattern, Bush proposed to develop missile defense systems 
in Poland and the Czech Republic, met with criticism and suspicion by Russian 
authorities. Although Bush claimed the operation targeted Iran’s offensive 
capabilities, the Kremlin understood it as an anti-Russian initiative. In 2005, 
Russian officials privately informed the American government of their pretension 
to leave the INF treaty, which came out publically in 2007. Harding (2007) 
presented the most compelling argument, arguing that Russia used the INF 
withdrawal as an implicit threat and retaliation against the U.S. “missile shield” 
in Europe. It is crucial to have in mind that without the INF, Russia can develop 
3 The ABM Treaty dealt with increasing concern with offensive capabilities, and the search for an effective 
defense system. With an effective defense system, one of the superpowers would have the ability to negate 
a first strike, destabilize strategic parity and encourage preemptive attacks. 
4 The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was a Reagan’s proposed missile defense system in outerspace to defend 
American and American-allies territories from ballistic nuclear weapons. He pledged for a defensive system to 
end nuclear-war possibility. Although the SDI had an important role in bilateral negotiations, it never came 
to fruition, given techonological and economic constraints. 
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and deploy offensive missile systems against Western and Eastern Europe that 
could easily overwhelm American defensive systems. Both in Russia and the 
U.S., the INF restrictiveness was criticized by hawkish characters, especially 
considering China’s rapid IRBM developments and stockpiling. For the Kremlin, 
Russia had more enemies on its borders than the U.S., so the Treaty was ill-suited 
to tackle their regional security concerns. However, Russia would not leave the 
INF Treaty, and in 2007 it officially proposed at the United Nations (UN) its 
globalization or multilateralization to incorporate new regional IRBM-owners. 
The U.S. government supported the request, but countries like China refused 
the expansion (Kearn 2012).
The Obama Administration and the Russian violations
The missile proliferation came to be an acute dispute in current international 
security policy-making. The Obama administration (2009-2017) carried out 
the anti-missile defense project in Europe, renaming it the Phased Adaptative 
Approach (PAA). The PAA set up four phases to the European defense system 
deployment. It began with the SM-3 Block IB maritime interceptor missiles in 
the Mediterranean (2011), followed by SM-3 Block IA (2015) in Romania, then 
SM-3 Block IIA model (2018) in Poland, and finally would reach a more accurate 
and robust SM-3 Block IIB model around 2020 (U.S. Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification, and Compliance 2011). Eventually, for budgetary and technical 
restraints, the PAA last phase was abandoned. The Russians continued their 
criticism, stating two potential menaces. First, the American system endangered 
global strategic parity because the interceptor missiles would be effective against 
their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Second, the American reasoning 
was unconvincing, and the Kremlin affirmed the Iranian inability to produce 
and deploy shortly a perilous IRBM against American allies in Eurasia (Collina 
2014). The Russians became sharper unease in 2013 when Iran negotiated the 
Joint Plan of Action, an agreement to freeze its nuclear program in exchange 
for economic and technological assistance with six powers.5 Even after the deal, 
5 The Geneva Interim Agreement was the first formal agreement between the U.S. and Iran since the 1979 
diplomatic breakup. Eventually, it led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when Iran signed up 
a nuclear deal with the United Nation’s Security Council permanent members plus the European Union. The 
JCPOA has receiving great attention since the Trump administration unilateral withdrawal. Recently, the Biden 
administration has promised to reengage America commitments to the deal (Davenport 2021). 
Vinicius Martins Dalbelo
  Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1173, 2021
9-24
the U.S. decided to stick to the defense system, which the Kremlin defended 
to be compelling evidence that the PAA was an anti-Russian initiative. Finally, 
the anti-missile defense systems issue has been expanding globally as the U.S. 
decided to supply its allies in the Middle East (United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia) and Far Asia (Japan and South Korea). Not for nothing, anti-missile 
systems came to be part of different countries’ military doctrines in the 2010s, 
such as China since 2013 (Farnsworth 2013).
Kearn’s vertical proliferation hypothesis has been proved, and it became further 
accentuated in the 2010s. India successfully tested two IRBMs in the period, its 
Agni-4 (3500 km) and Agni-5 (5000 km), which government officials considered 
a major technological breakthrough in the country’s military capabilities. The 
Indian example is exciting to understand the subtleties of missile proliferation in 
international relations. The IRBM class encompass missiles varying from 500km 
to 5500km, which raises meaningful geostrategic balance. In the Indian case, it is 
well documented its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, and both hold deterrence 
IRBMs aimed at each other. However, 1000km-IRBM is adequate for strategic 
deterrence. Thus Agni-4 and Agni-5 IRBMs are very likely not directed against 
the Muslim rival, but China. Not surprisingly, the Agni-5 could reach Beijing 
from anywhere in India (Crail and Masterson, 2012). Moreover, other countries 
developed their capabilities in the same period. Israel developed its Arrow-3, 
used in missile defense systems. Iran tested the Quad-F and Quad-H models in 
the Indian Ocean. North Korea tested its 2010 Musudan model several times, 
although not always successfully. Two important conclusions can be drawn. First, 
in all of these cases, the missiles are IRBM models that would be banned if the 
INF Treaty was multilateralized after the Russian-American initiative. Secondly, 
the intermediate-range missile proliferation has its main stage in Asia, fostering 
a dangerous arms race in the region, which has been escalating recently.
With the acceleration of ballistic-missile vertical proliferation, INF critics 
grounded their views in this new geopolitical environment. In the U.S., a hard-
line approach suggested the country could not adequately answer new challenges 
imposed by regional contesters, such as Iran, North Korea, and China. During the 
Obama administration, the Iranian nuclear program evolved into an existential 
threat to American hegemony in the Middle East (Pecequilo and Forner 2017). 
Fitzpatrick (2011) concluded that Iran was moving towards nuclear capability, 
which could be attached to their also in development IRBM arsenal. Rubin 
(2012, para. 36) described Iranian missile development as “a showcase of 
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missile proliferation” and argued that all the major obstacles to development, 
testing, and deployment would be rapidly overcome. In a very pessimistic 
conclusion, Rubin affirmed the missile non-proliferation regime’s feebleness to 
restrain Iran.
The North Korea case was assessed by Cha (2009), Fitzpatrick (2011), and 
Visentini and Pereira (2014). Similarly, the authors concluded the continuous 
threat imposed by a very isolated and recalcitrant state, engaged in a political game 
of concessions and extractions with the U.S. based on its nuclear development. 
Kearn (2012) contends that North Korea is potentially more dangerous than 
Iran, given its biological and chemical weapons capabilities, which also could 
be attached to the multi-setting IRBM. North Korea also poses a critical problem 
as an essential source of prohibited missile technologies, providing missiles and 
components to Iran, Syria, among others.
In turn, China represents a much more significant challenge for future 
American international position and security strategies. The Asian aspirant to 
superpower has been receiving a lot of attention from scholars and policy analysts 
worldwide, including its missile build-up, as can be seen in Tanner et al. (2006), 
Pecequilo e Carmo (2014), and Pinotti (2015). For our purpose, it suffices to 
understand that China has engaged in a rapid arsenal-building, and two critical 
concerns arise. First, about 90% of the Chinese arsenal is compounded by 
IRBM, and its missile build-up continues. Second, although the U.S. continental 
territory could not be reached from China with this missile model, the American 
presence in the Pacific ocean is severely compromised by the Chinese strategy 
known as A2/Area-Denial.6
Thus, it is not surprising that hawkish neoconservatives characters and 
institutions in the U.S. vocally expressed resentment with the INF, which they 
saw as limiting to American hegemony. On the other hand, the majority of 
scholars thought otherwise. Kearn’s 2012 seminal work is a primary example. 
The author argued the U.S. had several conventional options to respond to the 
emerging regional security challenges, and the INF treaty withdrawal would just 
add costly and unnecessary political disputes. Even worse, the Treaty’s demise 
would probably foster a new missile race.
6 According to Kearn (2012, 60:61) “anti-access measure to be any action by an opponent that has the effect 
of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain 
locations within the theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than 
they would normally prefer”. 
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To the dismay of international security policy-making specialists and scholars, 
a 2014 dispute between the U.S. and Russia led to the 2019 INF Treaty collapse. 
On January 30, 2014, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki confirmed an 
alleged Russian violation after The New York Times had come up with the public 
allegation on January 29. The paper quoted “a possibility that Russia might have 
violated the INF Treaty,” and the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, Rose Gottemoeller, had initiated dialogue with Russia and 
NATO members (Gordon 2014). Presently, new pieces of information have been 
released and permit a more detailed analysis. The U.S. first raised INF concerns in 
May 2013, when Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Thomas 
Donilon and Deputy Secretary of State William Burns met with Russian Security 
Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev. In June, the Russian Ambassador to the 
U.S. Sergey Kislyak denied any non-compliant activity, which was reasserted in 
November by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, who reaffirmed 
Russian commitment to the Treaty (U.S. Mission to International Organizations 
in Geneva 2019).
In July 2014, the American government confirmed the violation through the 
“Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control” report (U.S. Bureau of Arms 
Control, Verification, and Compliance 2014 , 5), although providing few details. 
Media outlets reported that Obama and Putin talked directly about the issue, 
agreeing to organize high-level meetings to find a solution. However, Russian 
authorities categorically denied American accusations, starting years of mutual 
recriminations.
In September 2014, the first high-level meeting occurred in Moscow. Soon 
after, State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf reported both parties were 
unable to reach common ground (Barnes 2014). Then, in December, a joint 
session of the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs congressional committees 
summoned White House officials to discuss the violations. Gottemoeller stated 
the administration’s willingness to resolve the impasse and possible responses 
were to be released. Among them, military alternatives caught up the attention 
because they allowed the U.S. to respond to the violation also transgressing the 
INF treaty. However, the Obama administration seemed determined to bring 
Russia back to compliance. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policies, Brian 
McKeon, certified this idea in “the U.S. wants to avoid an escalatory cycle of 
action and reaction” (quoted in Collina 2015, para. 7).
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During 2015 and 2016, Russian-American accusations and counter-accusations 
pattern reached a stalemate. The alleged INF violation became part of an increasing 
tension involving Crimea annexation, sanctions rounds, and Russia beginning 
an air campaign in Syria. As a consequence, the Obama administration adopted 
a broader response strategy towards Russia. Gottemoeller and McKeon testified 
in committees that “Russia is not violating the INF in isolation from its overall 
aggressive behaviour” (quoted Fieldhouse 2016, para. 23). Several bilateral and 
multilateral meetings took place, and NATO members were briefed about the 
Russian violation. In July 2016, during the Warsaw NATO Summit, members 
expressed their assessment, stating, “Allies therefore continue to call on Russia 
to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable 
compliance” (NATO 2016, para. 62).
After 2014, the Republican party gained control of the Senate, becoming the 
majority party in both legislative houses. Republicans lawmakers escalated the 
dispute, organizing more than 60 briefings, hearings, and meetings about the 
alleged INF violation. The more hard-line approach was felt in both the 2015 
and 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and reveal the increasing 
domestic political pressure over the administration to adopt tougher responses. 
The NDAA gathers all the provisions related to the annual budget and total 
expenditures of the Department of Defense, which allow, in practice, Congress 
to influence and directly impact agencies’ structures, personnel and even set 
the policies to be pursued. Notwithstanding, the American Congress exerts a 
formidable influence over foreign policy through its capacity to withhold or 
release necessary funds for diverse goals. In the 2015 NDAA, the Russian violation 
is acknowledged in Section 1244 (2), and in subsection (3) is quoted General 
Martin Dempsey’s assessment, stating “these violations are a serious challenge 
to the security of the United States and our allies. These actions, particularly 
when placed in the broader context of Russian regional aggression, must be met 
with a strategic response”. Section 1651 outlined Congress expectations about 
American responses. The lawmakers demanded a “detailed description of any 
steps being taken or planned […] to reduce the negative impact of such actions on 
the national security.” However, no drastic and specific military countermeasures 
were demanded (U.S. Congress 2015, 238, 274).
On the other hand, the 2016 NDAA represented a qualitative and quantitative 
change. Not only the Russian violation had gained much more consideration, 
as it also called for a tougher and hawkish stance. Congress praised Obama for 
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“efforts taken to compel Russia to return to compliance” using military and non-
military options, however criticizing his open-ended approach. In line with the 
official administration posture, Russian violation was seen as part of its overall 
aggressive and cheating behaviour. It was stated:
“not only should the Russian Federation end its cheating with respect to 
the INF Treaty, but also its illegal occupation of the sovereign territory of 
another nation, its plans for stationing nuclear weapons on that nation’s 
territory, and its cheating and violation of as many as eight of its 12 arms 
control obligations and agreements” (U.S. Congress 2016, 1061).
This time, the hawkish approach usually associated with the Republican 
party is very explicit in the Congress requirements. It was requested an Executive 
plan for developing the military capabilities, divided into counterforce and 
countervailing strike capabilities, outlining “whether or not such capabilities are 
in compliance with the INF Treaty” (U.S. Congress 2016, 1063). Doing so, the 
Republican-majority Congress not only allowed as also demanded an American 
response that ultimately would violate the INF treaty, opposing Obama’s diplomatic 
approach.
The Trump Administration:  
Hawkish, unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy
While the INF treaty demise represents a very important development in 
contemporary international relations and international security, it was relatively 
overshadowed by Trump’s administration bursting foreign policy agenda. In the 
last four years, scholars and specialists have been trying to grasp what such 
an erratic and unpredictable Trumpist foreign policy signifies for America’s 
great strategy, hegemonic role, and liberal international order. Trump has been 
acknowledged as an “isolationist” or “neo-isolationist,” and Gonçalves and 
Teixeira (2019) argue that despite his unpredictable nature, Trump followed his 
isolationist agenda, represented in the America First and Make America Great Again 
(MAGA) approaches. His political approach is based on “jacksonian populism, 
nationalism, and individualism” (Gonçalves and Teixeira 2019, 194). Pecequilo 
(2017, 347) argues that Trumpism represents the apex of “guilty outsourcing,” 
i.e., the former president inclination to attribute guilty to everybody else, which 
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supported his foreign policy. However, the author sustains that Trump continued 
the “internationalism unilateralist,” normally associated with the neoconservative 
movement and the Republican party. Overall, it seems to exist a common consent 
that Trump represents both a symptom and a booster for the current extremely 
divided American political landscape (Cruz 2019).
When Trump took office in 2017, the INF Russian violation remained in a 
deadlock. Despite its overall hard-line rhetoric, his administration kept a similar 
Obama’s stance towards the subject, avoiding aggressive confrontation and 
prioritizing a diplomatic approach. The new Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, 
and Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, kept direct negotiations with their 
Russian counterparts, however unsuccessfully. Further, Trump decided by another 
Obama’s diplomatic approach using the Special Verification Commission (SVC), 
the Treaty’s dispute resolution body founded in 1987 to follow the IRBM and 
GLCM destruction and on-spot verification. The SVC gathered on November 
16, 2016, and on December 12-14, 2017, with no positive results. For the first 
time, the National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director Christopher Ford 
announced which Russian missile model was in violation: known as SSC-8 by 
NATO members and 9M729 in Russia. The Kremlin recognized the existence of 
the 9M729 model but objected to its capacity to reach INF ranges (U.S. Mission 
in Geneva 2019). Since the first accusation in 2014, the U.S. government kept 
this piece of information hidden, which can be presumed to prevent Russian 
officials from understanding how current American intelligence information is 
gathered (U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva 2019).
The hawkish and unilateralist approach, largely associated with Trump’s 
foreign policy, would be felt in December 2017 after the administration released 
its INF Treaty Integrated Strategy, which stated:
“The Administration firmly believes, however, that the United States cannot 
stand still while the Russian Federation continues to develop military systems 
in violation of the Treaty. While the United States will continue to pursue a 
diplomatic solution, we are now pursuing economic and military measures 
intended to induce the Russian Federation to return to compliance. This 
includes a review of military concepts and options, including options for 
conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which 
would enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies, should 
the Russian Federation not return to compliance. This step will not violate 
our INF Treaty obligations. We are also prepared to cease such research 
and development activities if the Russian Federation returns to full and 
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verifiable compliance with its INF Treaty obligations.” (U.S. Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2017, para. 3)
The Integrated Strategy signals an important change: diplomacy would 
not exert the main role in inducing Russian return to compliance. In line with 
Republican lawmakers in Congress, the White House set a new approach to 
tackle the Russian violation, substantiating more economic sanctions and military 
pressures. A few weeks later, the U.S. Federal Register published a final rule 
adding Novator and Titan, two companies involved in developing Russian 9M729 
missile, to the Department of Commerce Entity List (U.S. Mission to International 
Organizations in Geneva 2019). Doing so, both companies became subject to 
special license requirements to export or transfer specified items, pressuring 
them to abnegate their ties with the Kremlin. More importantly, the White House 
seized the opportunity given by Republican-majority Congress to reinstate IRBM 
research and possible development to sway Russian authorities into compliance.
However, the new economic and strategic pressures proved unsuccessful. In 
2018, the American INF treaty withdrawal began. In June, by U.S. initiative, a 
third expert meeting took place, evincing Trump’s final effort towards a diplomatic 
resolution. However, after the meeting, Russian authorities refused any further 
discussion about the violating missile topic, seemingly shutting down a diplomatic 
solution. As Reif (2018, para. 4) suggests, after the Russian stance, Trump’s 
decision has “come together quickly”. In July, following American leading, 
the Brussels NATO Summit Declaration stated harshly, “Allies believe that, in 
the absence of any credible answer from Russia on this new missile, the most 
plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty” (NATO 
2018, para. 46).
Trump’s change of heart can be evidence of the great influence of his new 
national security adviser, John Bolton. Bolton had been a vocal critic of the INF 
treaty and was fundamental in the 2002 Bush ABM treaty withdrawal. In his 2020 
memoir, he states, “Since my days in George W. Bush’s Administration, I had 
wanted to extricate the United States from the INF”. His arguments synthesize very 
well the widespread criticism from hard-liners in the U.S.: i) persistent Russian 
breaches vitiated INF’s purpose; ii) The Treaty bounded no other countries, 
including the biggest threat facing the U.S., China; iii) the INF was outdated 
technologically, given sea- and air-launched missiles could hit the same targets 
(Bolton 2020, Cp.6). Bolton’s narrative must be apprehended cautiously due to his 
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role as an observer-participant in the policy-making. However, important insights 
can be observed and critically analyzed. Three aspects deserve detailed analysis: 
i) His personal opinions about Trump role and actions; ii) the neoconservative 
stance regarding American allies, especially European countries and NATO; iii) 
the Russian responses to the Trump administration.
As Gonçalves and Teixeira (2019) argue, Trump exhibited erratic behavior, 
which was quite pronounced in his foreign policy agenda. The INF withdrawal 
and Bolton’s accounts seem to demonstrate such behaviour. For instance, Bolton 
recounts that a mutual agreement between the NSC, the Department of Defense 
and the Department of State conformed to an exit schedule starting on December 
4, 2018, when the U.S. would officially notify and begin the departure process. 
However, just three days after being briefed on all the negotiation steps and 
planning, Trump announced the exit during a rally in Nevada, disregarding 
his staff completely and not considering any diplomatic and legal provision. 
Trump expressed: “Russia has violated the agreement; they have been violating 
it for many years. And we’re not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement 
and go out and do weapons and we’re not allowed to” (quoted Reif 2018, para. 
5). After Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’ great insistence, Trump would agree 
to return to the original schedule. Still, after a few days, he once more made 
inflammable statements about the U.S.’s departure, claiming that he would not 
accept “playing games” with the Russians and the Chinese. It is interesting 
to note that Bolton brings up such erratic behaviour, further claiming that he 
suspected the president did not fully understand what was going on. Implicitly, 
the former adviser argues that Trump was unable to understand the Treaty’s 
technical and legal aspects, having an almost childlike desire to leave as soon 
as possible to demonstrate a position of strength. While such a stance seems 
to have deeply bothered Jim Mattis, Bolton did not care at all because Trump’s 
posture was perfectly in line with his own goals.
Bolton’s neglect of Trump’s behaviour indicates another significant feature of 
Trumpism: its close association with the neoconservative movement, ideologically 
and pragmatically. As Pecequilo and Lopes (2018) affirm, Trump can be framed 
in the internationalism unilateralist approach in American foreign policy, which 
is largely associated with neoconservatives. The way the Trump administration 
managed European concerns during the withdrawal ground and deepened this 
instance. Bolton lampoons Europeans because they supposedly believe in living 
in a falsely peaceful world, while their enemies only grow stronger and threaten 
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them more and more. He is troubled by European leaders’ reluctance to affirm 
the Russian violation, fearing that they would be pressured to accept U.S. nuclear 
weapons in their territories in the future. Furthermore, his distress covers NATO, 
and Bolton is uncomfortable with Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg because 
even after he was presented with substantive evidence of the Russian material 
breach, he still questions the U.S. stance. Despite this, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel managed to convince Trump to postpone the exit process by 
60 days, committing herself to effectively supporting the exit decision if a 
diplomatic solution was not found. Interestingly, Bolton reports that Trump 
only accepted German request by privately indicating to his staff that the U.S. 
would withdraw from the Treaty, one way or another. Thus, it is possible to 
substantiate Pecequilo and Lopes’ claim, showing that Trump had no real intention 
to accommodate European concerns, focusing on his unilateralist and America 
First views.
The Trump White House disregard for its allies benefited Russian political 
efforts to vilify the U.S. among European countries. There is some consensus 
among experts that the INF end had greater advantages for the Russians than 
the Americans. The Kremlin was very effective in publicly pinpointing the U.S. 
at fault for the demise. For instance, during a press conference in Moscow in 
October 2018, Putin harshly accused American, but in private, Bolton tells the 
Russian leader seemed very little concerned about the Treaty’s demise and 
much more focused on what the United States intended after. Putin questioned 
whether the U.S. had any intention to deploy new IRBM in Europe, which would 
resume the same tensions from the 1980’s Euromissile crisis. More importantly, 
however, Putin has publicly and privately declared that Russia would respond 
with its own IRBM deployment against any European country that eventually 
could accept American former prohibited missiles. Hence, while the vertical 
proliferation had Asia as its main stage in recent years, the INF demise and the 
U.S. future development, production, and deployment have enormous potential 
to escalate tensions in the European theatre in the short and medium-term.
European diplomatic efforts and Russia threats had been no significant in 
Trump’s conviction. On February 2, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo formally 
declared the U.S. to withdraw within the 6-months deadline and the suspension 
of obligations. Russia reciprocated immediately, also informing its withdrawal. 
The six-month period was extremely bustling. On February 12, NATO Secretary 
Jens Stoltenberg reported that the alliance was “planning for a world without 
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the INF treaty.” In March, officials told that formerly banned missiles tests were 
scheduled for August, few days after the official withdrawal. The Pentagon was 
adapting the Navy’s Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) to turn it into 
a GLCM and expressed the possibility of deployment within 18 months (Taheran 
2019). For the first time, the administration requested a boost of $100 million 
in IRBM and GLCM research and development, which was denied by Congress, 
now with the Democratic majority. Finally, on August 2, the U.S. formalized its 
complete withdrawal.
Final Remarks
It is undeniable that the INF Treaty has played an important role in 
international relations over the past 30 years. Its existence became possible after 
a significant increase in tensions between the U.S. and the USSR during the 1980s 
when the superpowers clashed over the presence of intermediate-ballistic missiles 
in Europe. Among nuclear delivery systems, IRBM is very destabilizing, as they 
present geostrategic controversies much more complex than their alternatives, 
such as ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missiles), SLBM (sea-launched ballistic 
missiles) and ALBM (air-launched ballistic missiles). Furthermore, the INF 
became a milestone in the last years of the Cold War. It demonstrated the anti-
communist American president, Ronald Reagan, to negotiate pragmatically with 
the new Soviet leadership, represented by reformer Mikhail Gorbachev. The INF 
Treaty was the first time that the superpowers effectively managed to eliminate 
an entire class of nuclear weapons, which improved bilateral relations, fostered 
more security in Europe.
In the next two decades, INF and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives 
played a key role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The creation of the MTCR 
and the PSI fostered self-restrictions on the commercialization of equipment that 
could be used to produce offensive missiles. There seems to exist a consensus that 
the regime successfully prevented horizontal proliferation, hampering ballistic 
missiles arsenals from stretching globally. However, in recent years, a vertical 
proliferation has been observed in countries that already had their own technology, 
such as China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Especially in this decade, 
this proliferation has accelerated while, at the same time, these countries have 
become important contesting centres of U.S. hegemony.
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In parallel, Russian-American rivalry has rekindled recently, and the alleged 
2014 Russian violation fatally wounded the INF treaty. To be true, policy-makers 
and analysts in the United States believe that Russia has a general disregard 
for its commitments to arms control treaties and, most likely, its INF violation 
dwells far longer. During the Obama administration, a diplomatic approach 
was exerted to compel Russians to return to compliance. When Obama took 
office, he promised to reset the bilateral relations, but diverse geopolitical events 
heightened tensions and put the US-Russia rivalry back on the international stage. 
Simultaneously, the challenging and aggressive behavior of Iran and North Korea 
and the Chinese arsenal rapid growth have forced the United States to rethink its 
strategic position. Despite the new conflictive international system, no evidence 
suggests Obama’s intention to leave the Treaty, which his top officials considered 
effective and relevant to the United States’ long-term security.
Nonetheless, Donald Trump’s arrival in power significantly changed American 
foreign policy. Despite his aggressive rhetoric, Trump initially maintained a similar 
attitude to Obama, seeking a diplomatic resolution. However, with the arrival of 
a well-known hawkish to the post of NSC adviser (John Bolton) and constant 
failures in the diplomatic talks, Trump took a more unilateralist, isolationist 
and hawkish position. Moreover, with a Republican-majority Congress, the 
administration approved budgets that ultimately weakened the INF’s objectives 
and put the United States on a path of non-compliance. In late 2017, Trump’s 
change-of-mind was swift. The INF Integrated Strategy assumed the more hawkish 
content since the beginning of the conflict, pledging more economic sanctions 
and military responses. Diplomatic encounters during 2018 were to no avail, 
and despite requests from European allies, the administration followed its way 
out. On August 2, 2019, the INF treaty effectively ended.
Since the INF demise, the Department of Defense has conducted at least two 
IRBM and GLCM tests previously prohibited. However, after the 2018 midterm 
elections, the Democratic party regained control of Congress and has systematically 
refused and downplayed budgetary provisions for research and testing new IRBM. 
With Biden’s victory in 2020, arms control talks between the U.S. and Russia 
seem well-balanced for the moment, evinced by the Russian-American extension 
of the New START, an Obama era treaty and the last functioning nuclear deal in 
place. On the other hand, although the Russian-American and Chinese-American 
tensions have escalated further, the coronavirus pandemic has shrouded diverse 
geopolitical disputes while countries manage the domestic difficulties raised by 
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this unexpected scenario. Nonetheless, for the medium-term, it is expected that 
new disputes regarding missile proliferation resume and further investigations 
will be vital to better understand the INF Treaty outcomes and consequences 
for international security.
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